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Highlights
Although the 4th Railway Package was proposed by the European 
Commission in 2013, a consensus has not yet been reached. Recently, 
however, significant steps forward have been taken. Various stakeholders 
and prominent academics in the field gathered at the 9th Florence Rail 
Forum to reflect upon the latest developments in the legislative process. 
Discussion at the Forum focused on the opening of competition in 
rail passenger transport and the changing role of the regulators at all 
levels. According to the provisions listed in the 4th Railway Package, the 
tasks of the national regulatory authorities are likely to increase, and, 
inevitably, new challenges will arise. Regulators will play a crucial role 
when it comes to resolving two major issues:  on the one hand, how 
to harmonise the openness of the market of commercial lines so as to 
guarantee fair and open access to the network in all EU countries for all 
operators; on the other hand, how to deal with the provision of services 
under Public Service Obligations (PSO) and how to differentiate 
between directly awarded contracts and competitive tendering for PSO 
lines. 
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The 4th Railway Package: further 
challenges for the regulator
 
The aim of the 9th Florence Rail Forum was to discuss the proposed 4th Railway 
Package, especially the aspect of the opening of domestic rail passenger 
markets. Other elements of the package, such as the technical pillar and the 
financing components, had already been discussed previously in Florence. 
 
To recall, the European Commission issued a Communication on the 4th 
Railway Package (COM(2013)25) in early 2013, only one year after the 
approval of the Recast. The European Parliament subsequently adopted its 
first reading position on the six legislative proposals in February 2014. But, 
as of today, a consensus on the different elements of the proposal has not yet 
been reached, and the Package is still in discussion. 
Still it appears that on the so-called “technical pillar” (safety and interoperability 
Directives along with a new regulation on the European Railway Agency) the 
Council is supporting the Commission’s proposal which had already been 
voted by the Parliament. Overall, there seems to be a broad agreement on the 
need to remove existing administrative and technical barriers to enable the 
Single European Railway Area.
However, opening up the market in domestic rail passenger transport is more 
controversial, and two major issues are particularly under discussion, namely 
(1) the opening up of domestic commercial lines, where the main challenge is 
to guarantee fair and open access to the network (especially in those countries 
where vertically integrated railway undertakings operate) and (2) the complex 
relationship with services provided under Public Service Obligations (PSOs). 
Here, the 4th Railway Package actually amends Regulation 1370/2007 and the 
Commission foresees a differentiation between smaller scale contracts (which 
may be directly awarded to an operator) and larger contracts (which will have 
to be opened for competitive tendering).
In both cases, the national regulator will have to play a key role and will thus 
have to be considerably strengthened. Already in the Recast, the regulator had 
been given more powers, and the 4th Railway Package is further strengthening 
its role, especially when it comes to overseeing the independence, the 
transparency, the impartiality and the non-discriminatory behaviour of the 
infrastructure managers, as well as of the services facilities managers. This 
role is even more important in the case of integrated railway undertakings. 
What is new is the constantly growing powers of the regulator in this matter.
In addition, the 4th Railway Package raises a series of new and unprecedented 
challenges for the railway regulators worth highlighting, namely:
- A first challenge is to regulate “reciprocity”: as a matter of fact, the European 
Commission supports a ‘verification clause’ according to which integrated 
railway companies could be banned from operating abroad, if they do not 
guarantee free access in their home country (COM(2013)29). It is not clear, 
how this provision can be dealt with by the regulators.
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- A second challenge pertains to the role of the regulator in competitive 
tendering, notably when exclusive franchises (so-called “competitive 
contracts”) are awarded (as opposed to open access). In this case, does the 
regulator have to ensure competitive tendering (and how would he do that 
concretely?) or should he simply serve as an appeal body in the case of 
complaints? 
- Related to this is the third challenge, namely the role of the regulator in 
performing the so-called “economic equilibrium test”. This test must be applied 
by regulators in order to decide whether competition in the market (open 
access) or competition for the market (competitive tendering) has to be 
applied. 
- Furthermore, the idea has emerged that a combination of competitive and 
PSO contracts could be awarded. This constitutes the fourth new challenge 
for regulators and raises in particular the question of how to “package” such 
competitive and PSO contracts together: what role exactly will regulators 
have to play when competitive and PSO contracts are combined?
 In addition to these four very concrete new challenges for regulators, further 
questions arise from the 4th Railway Package as to their future role. These 
questions will inevitably have to be addressed at some point by the policy 
makers. They are as follows:
- As regulators will, sooner or later, get involved in PSO contracts, the 
question arises as to whether they should also tackle PSO financing. And how 
concretely they would do that.
- Another related question pertains to the future relationship between railway 
regulators and Transport Authorities, as it are these Transport Authorities 
that currently award the PSO contracts.
- Furthermore, the question will arise as to whether regulators should play 
a role in transport plans, infrastructure developments and other planning 
instruments, as they all have the potential of being discriminatory.
- Another question will pertain to performance, especially the performance 
of the infrastructure managers: should regulators oversee their performance? 
A question which is in direct relationship with the costs of using the 
infrastructure. 
- Finally, the question remains as to which role regulators should play in 
ensuring passenger rights, the enforcement of which, has, so far, not yet been 
explicitly attributed to rail regulators.
We will discuss at least some of these broader questions during our upcoming 
Florence Rail Forums!
Matthias Finger
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9th Florence Rail 
Forum - Summaries 
of discussions
Discussions during the 9th Florence Rail Forum were 
structured around three main elements: 
• The 4th Railway Package under negotiation – where 
do we stand?
• Liberalization of national passenger markets – which 
way forward for competitive lines and PSO?
• What role for regulators?
The 4th Railway Package under negotiation 
– where do we stand?
Several elements of the 4th Railway Package are 
still under discussion at the Community level, and 
the Commission, the European Parliament and the 
Council are still negotiating their position . In the 
debates at the Forum it became clear that the market 
pillar is still conflictual while agreement has largely 
been achieved on the technical pillar. 
Several participants at the Rail Forum expressed 
criticism on some amendments introduced by the 
European Parliament, which were described as a 
watering down of the initial Commission draft in terms 
of providing for independent regulators and fair open 
market competition. The amendments of the plenary 
of the Parliament, which - as was pointed out - were 
taken against the recommendations of the  Transport 
and Tourism Committee, would significantly weaken 
the “Chinese walls” which the Commission aims 
at introducing in order to guarantee independence 
between operator and network management in 
integrated rail companies. At the same time there were 
also other amendments that were received positively 
because they provided clarification.
Several concerns expressed by Member States 
(Council level) and associations were shared by the 
Commission, and the importance of mutual openness 
was underlined. It became clear that negotiations 
between Parliament, Commission and Council would 
go on. While there was agreement that the proposal 
should be less prescriptive it was the perception of the 
Commission and other stakeholders that the European 
Parliament with its amendments “had thrown out 
the baby with the bath water” by removing too many 
crucial elements. It was suggested that the focus should 
now be on making sure the regulation contains the 
necessary safeguards without being too prescriptive. 
This refers in particular to the governance rules for 
imposing Public Service Obligations (PSOs).
Some of the regulators expressed concern about the fact 
that the Parliament had limited the essential functions 
of the regulator to path allocation and infrastructure 
charging. Several also considered traffic management 
and maintenance as having a competitive impact and 
would like to see them included in the functions of the 
regulator. 
Separating the technical and the political pillar?
On the procedural side an important element is the 
question of whether the political and the technical 
pillar of the 4th Railway Package should be split up. 
During the Forum some pointed out that the Italian 
Council presidency failed to conclude the negotiations 
on the technical pillar, which will now be concluded 
under the Latvian presidency.
The Commission does not want to “hold the technical 
pillar hostage” to achieve progress on the political pillar. 
Nevertheless there is the fear of “losing momentum” 
if the technical pillar is voted on separately. It was 
recalled that it is currently the European Parliament 
that wants to achieve progress on the political pillar. 
The discussion often came back to where a possible 
compromise could lay between the sometimes 
divergent positions of Council, Commission and 
Parliament.
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Only Great Britain has chosen for a regime that is 
almost entirely based on competitive tendering in the 
rail sector. After its introduction passenger numbers 
gradually rose to an all-time maximum and from a 
burden to the public purse the sum of all franchises can 
now be provided with almost no subsidy. Despite this, 
the McNulty study published in 2011 by the British 
government and Rail Regulator found the network as a 
whole (i.e. including the infrastructure) to be inefficient 
with costs 30% in excess of its peers, with misalignment 
of incentives between players as a main cause after the 
vertical separation introduced in the 1990s. Alliancing 
between infrastructure management and train 
operations was suggested (and is currently tried) as a way 
to solve part of these problems; tendering of vertically 
integrated franchises was suggested but not tried yet 
(see also the article by Prof. Nash in this Observer).
No other country has chosen to introduce a similar 
regime. Those that have introduced competitive 
tendering in their railway sector have done so on 
regional routes (often branch lines) or local services 
on the main network, and did this in rather small 
contracts compared to the British practice. This is best 
exemplified by Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands. 
Efficiency gains of around 20% are often reported, as 
are innovations: new rolling stock, higher frequencies, 
more attractive services, better integration with 
local and regional public transport services, etcetera. 
Thorough studies reviewing these practices remain 
scarce, and in depth European comparisons close to 
inexistent. Nevertheless, the measures included in 
the 4th Railway Package suggested by the EC ask for 
tendering all PSO services, together with open access 
on commercially viable services. This is backed by 
an impact assessment report, the quality of which has 
been criticized. The Impact Assessment Unit of the 
European Parliament even writes (May 2013): “Assumed 
impacts of the different options are well illustrated and 
described, but the reasoning as to why these impacts 
occur as a result of a specific policy does not appear 
to be based on facts, academic literature or existing 
evidence.” So is this policy dogmatic and unfounded? 
Several remarks should be made to inform the debate.
Competitive tendering outside the UK often came 
with decentralising services from national to regional 
tiers of government who took this opportunity to force 
new operators to provide service characteristics that 
incumbent state monopolists often were reluctant to 
provide, or could not fund without added public money. 
Note that in many cases regional authorities even chose 
to bear themselves the revenue risk of those services. 
Many observed innovations are therefore the direct 
result of shifts towards more voluntaristic regional rail 
policies focussing on expansion, improvement and 
better integration with local public transport as input 
to – and not as outcome of – competitive tendering. 
The competitive nature of tendering did indeed lead to 
efficiency improvements in productive terms: higher 
staff and rolling stock productivity, new maintenance 
practices, etc., even though this was to some extent the 
result of the possibility (or even obligation) given to 
winning operators to adopt simplified working practices 
(such as using no conductor in the Dutch case). However, 
note also the cost increases observed in Great-Britain.
As passenger transport services are characterised by 
strong consumer side network effects, splitting large 
networks into smaller tendered parts will therefore 
require coordination. Balancing contract size, operator 
freedom and central planning will therefore be a 
challenging task when continuing on the tendering 
path. The danger is that the desired-for entrepreneurial 
freedom of the operator gets – paradoxically – 
replaced by a large share of central planning. 
Finally, the growing discussion and growing body of 
evidence showing that vertical separation might increase 
costs due to incentive misalignments (McNulty study), 
in particular under high-density traffic (EVES-Rail 
study) is also important. While the EC takes the position 
Further on the railway tendering path 
Didier van de Velde | Delft University of Technology; Faculty of Technology, Policy and 
Management; Section Policy, Organisation, Law and Gaming 
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Competition – a goal in itself or a strategy for efficiency?
It was generally well received that the discussion on 
the 4th Railway Package has moved from a rather 
ideological approach to a more constructive approach. 
In the current discussion, at least at this 9th Florence 
Rail Forum, there is a clear focus on the cost of the 
rail system. One of the central statements was that 
competition or any governance approach in itself does 
not have a purpose if it leads to an increase of the overall 
cost of the rail system. One very concrete example 
that was given refers to the provision of separating IT 
systems between operator and infrastructure manager 
where there may be less costly alternatives to the 
current approach: instead of forcing rail companies 
to invest several hundred millions for the set-up of 
new IT systems the same goal can be achieved with 
an audit and corresponding penalties in cases of 
noncompliance. 
There are different opinions on the effect of market 
elements in the rail system as also divergent experiences 
were made in different countries. It was pointed out 
that stakeholders need to accept that competition is 
the chosen strategy to achieve efficiency in the EU 
– even though it is not excluded that efficiency can 
be achieved by other means as well. It was clear that 
there are many instances that question any direct 
relation between open markets and cost savings. Yet 
the focus of European Rail policy lies on addressing 
the inconsistencies yet sticking to making use of 
competition as an instrument to achieve efficiency.
Liberalization of national passenger markets 
– which way forward for competitive lines 
and PSO?
In the discussion about the effects of competition - 
both on open access lines and for contracts in PSOs in 
competitive tendering procedures - many references 
were made to the British example and what conclusions 
to draw from it. Britain was described as “15 years 
ahead” with reforms the EU is currently advocating.
In this regard the McNulty report was often referenced. 
One suggestion was that there has to be a different view 
on railway governance as a whole. Given the high costs 
of the system in Britain today, what is needed is better 
coordination. Access charges alone are not sufficient as 
an instrument for coordination. Also the coordination 
that can be achieved through non-binding mechanisms 
does not extend beyond issues that involve the 
allocation of funds. It was concluded by some that, 
in order to achieve such coordination, integration 
between operator and infrastructure manager was 
needed – in spite of this being in contradiction to the 
principle of vertical seperation.
It became clear that the relationship between 
competition, on the one hand, and overall network 
coordination, on the other, is especially acute in 
densely used networks and in smaller countries. As 
regards the question of whether Member States shall 
be allowed to contract entire networks or whether 
a certain minimum amount of contracts shall be 
that vertical separation is necessary to guarantee fair 
competition and that competition is necessary to 
guarantee customer focus and market innovation, practice 
shows that tendering can be large and growing even in the 
absence of full vertical separation (Germany). Therefore, 
a growingly relevant question is whether over the longer 
run vertical separation could be a costly obstacle to 
sector-wide optimisation. Shake-ups and management 
reforms of old railways were long overdue but the 
resulting performance improvements – often attributed 
to vertical separation – may well have been realised 
under different institutional configurations. Inspiration 
from the long-term system-wide (train/infrastructure) 
optimisation commonly realised by the Japanese private 
and vertically integrated railways could usefully be taken 
here and one desirable step in that direction would be 
to implement cases of vertically integrated franchises 
to see how that model could combine benefits from 
competition with those from vertical integration.
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mandatory, the Commission acknowledges the risk 
of fragmentation in smaller networks. A compromise 
could be to allow a differentiation depending on the 
size of the network.
Tendering of PSOs
An important aspect of the discussion was the role of 
markets in PSOs. While there is general agreement 
on introducing competitive tendering, different views 
were expressed on the how and why. For instance, direct 
award should be limited to exceptional situations, 
and on this point the Parliament’s amendments were 
considered as too permissive. However, another 
opinion expressed was that the competence to decide 
whether or not to impose a PSO has to remain 
with the local transport authority: even in cases of 
commercially attractive lines a city or a region should 
have the possibility to offer more or better services than 
the market would provide on its own. It became clear 
that there was some opposition to the new definition 
of Public Transport Authorities (PTAs), which some 
consider as too narrow. A possible outcome may be 
that the current definition will not be changed. There 
was a general agreement on the question whether 
mandatory tendering would bring down costs. Many 
cases spoke in favor of the assumption that the process 
of tendering would reduce costs and thus the burden for 
the tax payer. Yet also several caveats to this assumption 
were presented. Competition may sometimes come 
at a price that is higher than the actual cost savings 
achieved by it. While in many ways unique, the British 
case illustrates this problem as in spite of a relatively 
smoothly working system of tendering overall system 
costs are too high.
Level playing field and legacy costs
It was stressed by some operators that fair conditions 
were needed not just for new entrants but also for 
incumbent operators. It was pointed out that incumbent 
operators, unlike new entrants, are burdened with 
significant legacy costs. It was pointed out that with 
their current debt resulting from retirement schemes 
and employee friendly work time arrangements, several 
operators are not able to compete with companies that 
do not face such costs. There were different views and 
different experiences on that issue. In some countries 
such as GB the winner of a competitive tender takes 
over the operating company including its staff, so the 
age of staff and pensions cost are not an issue in the 
competition. However, it was also stressed that in other 
cases tenders were frequently won by the companies 
with the youngest workforce as they could offer the 
lowest wage costs. To date there are no uniform rules 
on the obligations of a new operators vis-à-vis their 
predecessors. The availability of rolling stock was 
mentioned as one of the biggest remaining issues.
Competitive pressure is however an important driver 
for change and can facilitate a process of making the 
railway companies more efficient. However, it was 
recalled that railways are very different from other 
industries. Because of its nature, the principle of 
“creative destruction” where new and agile companies 
replace old incumbent inefficient ones, does not apply 
to railways: size and age can be a good thing in railways 
also from an efficiency perspective. This is why it is 
necessary to help the change process of the incumbent 
operators before introducing competition.
 
 
Public Transport Plans and Network Statements
Some concerns were raised over the level of detail and 
prescriptiveness required of  Public Transport Plans 
and Network Statements. Yet from the Commission 
side it is clear that the plans serve as a means to address 
the crucial issue of gradually defining common rules 
for the imposition of PSOs. 
Also, the importance of introducing more reliability 
of financing was stressed from several sides. The 
Network Statement should clarify what kind of major 
disruptions will impact the network over the upcoming 
five years. Such information is needed by all operators 
to make business decisions. Many believed that the 
way this is managed in Great Britain is exemplary.
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The overall policy objective of the European Union for 
the railway industry has traditionally been the creation of 
the Single European Railway Area. The full exploitation of 
economies of scale at a continental level will ensure significant 
benefits to European citizens. Cross-border services are only 
an example. A more efficient provision of national services, 
even of regional and suburban railway services, could be 
reached if large European-wide service providers would 
compete in the market or for such markets. The consecutive 
Railway Packages have tried to eliminate obstacles for the 
creation of railway transport providers with a European-wide 
scope. 
The Fourth Package could finally eliminate the most basic 
and structural obstacle to the Single European Railway Area: 
the national monopolies for the provision of national railway 
services. 30 years after the first intervention of the European 
Union, the traditional market structure of the industry could 
be finally transformed. However, the elimination of national 
monopolies is only a precondition for the creation of the 
Single European Railway Area. 
As in most network industries, the vertical integration of 
network and transport services is rightly perceived as an 
obstacle to competition. As railway networks are natural 
monopolies that require significant support from public 
budgets, national monopolies seem to be the only choice 
for the management of the railway infrastructure. Vertical 
integration could automatically extend the national 
monopoly over networks to the downstream market of 
transport services. As a result, railway services would still be 
defined along national borders.
Vertical separation was the preferred remedy for the 
European Commission. However, it has been severely 
opposed by some of the most relevant players in the industry. 
Furthermore, uneven implementation of vertical separation 
has created unacceptable asymmetries between vertically 
separated players in some member States and vertically 
integrated players (even if as a holding) in other Member 
States. Too much energy might have been consumed in the 
debate over vertical separation. Behavioral remedies have 
proved successful in other network industries. The adoption 
of a full regulatory framework on access to vertically 
integrated networks has allowed vibrant competition in the 
telecommunications industry. It has allowed market entry to 
new postal players. 
Competition law has proven to be an effective safety network 
for those occasions where the regulatory framework has not 
ensured fair access and a level playing field for competition. 
Intervention against margin squeeze by vertically integrated 
network operators has resulted in major fines of the European 
Commission and the National Competition Authorities for 
abuse of dominant position by traditional monopolies in the 
telecommunications and postal industries. 
Another obstacle for the emergence of European players 
are specific national policies for the provision of services of 
general economic interest. National monopolies exploiting 
cross-subsidies and benefiting of state aids for the provision of 
other services are an obstacle for the Single European Railway 
Area. However, general economic interest can be protected 
through other instruments which are just as effective and 
are fully compatible with the creation of European-wide 
operators. The general regulatory framework designed by the 
European institutions for the services of general economic 
interest (Altmark and the subsequent application of the state 
aid rules by the European Commission) allows Member States 
to define their own policies to support railway services. Such 
framework unbundles the key elements of the public policy 
(objective identification of public service objectives, of the 
best provider of the service, and of the cost of the provision 
of the service) in such a way that public intervention does not 
require a national monopoly and therefore is not an obstacle 
to the European Area. The full development of the 1370/2007 
Regulation is necessary to complete the process.
Finally, European-wide players can only emerge through 
consolidation of the existing national players. The same 
process has been identified in most industries. In other 
network industries, former national monopolies are 
expanding around Europe: a Spanish telecom operator is a 
relevant player in several countries, a Dutch express mail 
operator is active in most Member States, an Italian electricity 
operator is a leading player in other Member States, etc.
It is important to ensure that the consolidation process 
evolves in objective and fair terms. No artificial obstacles 
should be posed to the process, and no artificial advantages 
should be given to specific players. The rules on state aids 
should be strictly applied to avoid discrimination.
The reform of the railway industry will not be completed with 
the elimination of national monopolies. Competition has to 
rely on a clear and fair regulatory regime for legal certainty: 
Clear and fair rules on network access, rules on services of 
general economic interest and rules on state aid.
Back To Basics 
Juan J. Montero UNED University, Madrid
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Another question discussed was whether tendering 
PSOs would increase investments in innovation and 
improvement of service. While the case of Sweden was 
often presented as a positive example for this, it was also 
pointed out that those innovation activities were not 
actually the result of entrepreneurial decisions by the 
private operators but rather the reaction to direct and 
prescriptive orders by the transport authority. Here the 
discussion also touched upon the power relationship 
between operators and transport authorities. Transport 
authorities may use the tendering requirement as 
leverage to impose decisions on the operators.
Competition and competitive lines
The discussion focused on competitive tendering 
and competition “for the market”. It is clear that open 
access competition (“competition in the market”) still 
remains an exception. As open access systems develop 
it emerges frequently that the “rules of the game” have 
yet to be defined for such situations.
The cost and the benefit of vertical separation
 As often before opinions were divided on the question 
of railway governance and unbundling. With regard 
to the different experiences made it was pointed out 
that vertical separation increases the need for external 
coordination, which increases overall costs. It became 
clear that there will be different models in the future 
and fully integrated Railway Companies will continue 
to exist as well as fully separated ones. While it is 
still controversial, the discussion on this issue in the 
European policy debate is about to come to an end: 
there is political agreement on the principle of leaving 
it up to Member States to decide on the organizational 
model for their railway companies. Closely related 
to this topic was a discussion on reciprocity: in its 
proposal the Commission had foreseen the possibility 
to exclude railway companies with insufficiently open 
markets in their home country from operating on other 
markets. It remained open if and in what form this 
principle will stay in the final text. The most important 
open question concerning this is by which body and 
based on which principle this would be decided on.
The point was raised that the “price to be paid” for 
abandoning the aim of full vertical separation will be 
enabling fully competent and independent regulators. 
This issue was discussed in more detail in the last 
session.
What role for regulators?
Overall, among the stakeholders present at the 9th 
Florence Rail Forum there was agreement on the 
need for strong regulators. To operate effectively they 
need clear rules, legal certainty and sufficient funding. 
Furthermore clarification is needed on the role of the 
regulators vis-à-vis other actors. Also discussed were 
the key functions of the national regulators. Going 
beyond what is already foreseen by current legislation, 
the 4th Railway Package would introduce the task of:
• Insuring the independence of the infrastructure 
manager and the compatibility of the appointments in 
key positions of infrastructure managers and operators;
• Performing the economic equilibrium test in the 
context of the imposition of PSO services.
Regulators in the Member States are at very different 
stages of their development, and this element was 
very prominent in the discussion already in the past 
Florence Forums1 . In Italy a fairly new regulatory 
body is beginning to take an important role in the 
regulation of competition of railways. This is a unique 
example as open market competition for high speed 
train services does not exist in other countries in the 
EU. Here the regulator has to lay out rules for a fair 
system of capacity allocation, which can be a sensitive 
issue in particular where highly requested paths and 
times slots are concerned. A way to go about this is 
to increase the transparency of the capacity allocation 
process and the coordination process in particular. 
This includes disclosing information to interested 
parties about paths requested by other applicants 
and operational details on the allocation procedure 
followed. 
1. 7th Florence Rail Forum (Florence, 29th November 2013) 
Current Challenges of Rail Regulation in Europe: The European 
Regulators‘ View 
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Britain is the country with the most experience of rail passenger 
market competition in Europe. Virtually the entire network is 
subject to competition for the market through franchising, and 
this has been the case since 1994-7 so most franchises have been 
let more than once. It also has a limited amount of competition 
in the market, both where franchises overlap and also because 
open access competition is permitted as long as the regulator 
judges it will bring significant new traffic to  the railway rather 
than simply abstracting traffic from the franchisee.
The British experience is often claimed to be a big success 
(ATOC, 2013) and indeed passenger traffic has grown by 
more than two thirds since 1997. However, Wardman (2006) 
finds a large part of the growth to be due to external factors: 
strong economic growth over much of the period at a time of 
only slowly growing car ownership and increasing car journey 
times and cost (unlike earlier times when rapidly growing car 
ownership, the construction of the motorway network and 
reducing car operating cost offset the benefits to rail of growing 
incomes). Even where growth was due to improved services 
and new rolling stock, much of this was specified for and paid 
for by the government. Nevertheless he did find a small positive 
residual effect of the introduction of franchising.  
What is less encouraging is that overall real cost per passenger 
train kilometre is 25% higher than it was in 1997, with most of 
the increase being in infrastructure cost but a small increase 
even in train operating cost (Smith and Nash, 2014). The 
McNulty report (McNulty, 2011) found a major cause of this 
increase to be a lack of alignment of incentives to optimise 
system cost between infrastructure manager and train 
operating companies, and advocated closer working together, 
including alliances or joint ventures between the two. The most 
extreme example of this to date is that of South West Trains, 
where an alliance involves complete sharing of staff (other than 
the most senior) and of changes of revenue and cost from that 
foreseen at the time of the alliance, thus completely aligning 
incentives.  
But other problems have been clear. Although franchise length 
has varied, it has typically been less than 10 years, and it appears 
that this has been too short to incentivise train operating 
companies to seek major changes in operating practices or to 
look for major innovations in rolling stock (Nash et al, 2014). 
Financial problems of franchisees have in some cases been met 
by renegotiation or – worse – putting franchises on short run 
management contracts. Many of the franchises have been too 
large, whilst splitting services on a particular route between 
operators (whether by overlapping franchises or by open access 
competition) loses economies of scope (Wheat and Smith, 
2015). Competition between train operators for skilled staff 
has led to labour cost for train operators rising much faster 
than in the economy as a whole.  
One particular aspect of franchising in Britain which is 
different from any other European country is that the process 
was started by creating 25 companies from the British rail 
passenger network; whoever wins a franchise takes over this 
company, rather than assembling their own staff and assets. This 
leads to a relatively fast and trouble free handover compared 
with other countries where handovers have sometimes been 
characterised by severe shortages of labour and many cancelled 
services. Doing anything else when franchising is practiced on 
such a large scale as in Britain may be problematic. But it does 
remove the pressure of a potential newcomer entering with 
lower labour costs or higher productivity.  
British experience seems to suggest two alternative ways 
forward suitable for different types of service. Firstly small 
short tightly controlled gross cost franchises may be suitable, 
where there is a relevant authority able efficiently to undertake 
service planning, pricing, marketing and procurement and it 
makes sense for them to do so as part of an integrated network 
for all modes.  Such contracts focus attention on meeting the 
requirements of the franchising authority at minimum cost. 
The sole (to date) example of this in Britain is the London 
Overground – a 6 year franchise. The second is medium sized 
long franchises with a lot more freedom to invest and to develop 
services themselves. Chiltern, with a 20 year franchise is a good 
example of this. What is clear is that franchising involves a lot 
of choices for the franchising authority and getting these wrong 
can seriously damage the outcome of the process.   
Rail passenger market competition in 
Britain
Chris Nash - Institute for Transport Studies University of Leeds
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Adequate financing of regulators needs to be ensured. 
The risk was mentioned that ever more tasks are 
conferred upon regulators which can however not be 
carried out sufficiently due to a lack of resources.
In the discussion there were also some challenging 
opinions on the future role of regulators and transport 
authorities. Many of the tasks carried out by regulators 
or transport authorities touch upon important 
entrepreneurial decisions of the railway companies. 
Furthermore according to some the experience in 
Britain leads to no other conclusion as that efficient 
coordination in an unbundled system is not possible 
without extensive coordination by the state level. 
This leads to a paradox that, what was meant as a 
program to restrict the role of the state and unleash 
the productive energy of private operators might lead 
to (or necessitate) an even bigger state bureaucracy to 
counterbalance the undesired effects.
References
ATOC (2013) Growth and Prosperity: How franchising helped 
transform the railway into a British success story. ATOC, 
London. 
McNulty, Sir R (2011) Realising the potential of GB Rail: 
final independent report of the Rail Value for Money study. 
Department for Transport and Office of Rail Regulation, 
London.
Andrew Smith and Chris Nash (2014) Rail Efficiency: cost 
research and its implications for policy. Forthcoming ITF 
Discussion Paper.
Chris Nash, Andrew Smith, Roger Goodall, Nicole Kudla and 
Rico Merkert (2014) Economic Incentives for Innovation: 
A comparative study of the Rail and Aviation Industries 
(Feasibility Study): Final report. University of Leeds
Wardman, M. (2006): ‘Demand for rail travel and the effects of 
external factors’, Transportation Research, 42(3), 129–48.
Wheat, P.E. and Smith, A.S.J. (2015), Do the usual results of 
railway economies of scale and density hold in the case of 
heterogeneity in outputs: A hedonic cost function approach, 
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy. 49(1) 35-57.
12 ■  FSR Transport ■ Issue 2014/08 ■ December 2014
Further readings
Florence School of Regulation Transport Area, 2014, 9th European Rail 
Transport Regulation Summary: Discussing the 4th Railway Package: 
which role for markets in domestic rail passenger transport?
This document summarises the content of the presentations delivered 
during the 9th Florence Rail Forum, offering short summaries of each 
presentation, and illustrating the main points made and matters treated.
Presentations were delivered by representatives of different types of 
stakeholders, who reacted to the same initial questions that have been 
addressed in the present Observer:
• The Fourth Railway Package under negotiation – where do we stand?
• Liberalisation of national passenger markets – which way forward for 
competitive lines and PSO?
• Tendering of PSOs: what are the remaining challenges?
• Which role for national regulators and competent transport authorities?
McNulty, Roy, 2011, Realising the Potential of GB Rail: Report of the 
Rail Value for Money Study
The Value for Money Study was commissioned jointly by the Department 
for Transport and the Office of Rail Regulation. According to the Report, 
lessons should be learnt from history. Therefore, on the basis of the 
British experience and with the scope to address the British authorities, 
a wide range of recommendations focused on creating an industry 
environment which encourages cost reduction, changes which deliver 
new efficiencies, and mechanisms to drive implementation are put 
forward. The Study estimates that implementing these recommendations 
could deliver savings between £700 million and £1 billion annually by 
2019.
van de Velde, D., C. Nash, A. Smith, F. Mizutani, S. Uranishi, M. Lijesen 
and F. Zschoche (2012) “EVES‐Rail – Economic effects of Vertical 
Separation in the railway sector”
The goal of this study is to assess the potential impact of various forms 
of partial or total vertical separation in the rail sector in the European 
context. A main policy question is whether a limitation in the choice 
between structural railway regimes is recommendable or not. Existing 
economic studies draw mixed conclusions about the impacts of various 
reforms – hence the need for a thorough assessment of key impacts 
13 ■ Discussing the 4th Railway Package: which role for markets in domestic rail passenger transport?
and mechanisms in order to guide policy‐makers ahead of discussions 
pertaining to the Fourth Railway Package.
Montero, Juan J., 2014, Rail Transport: A Balance Sheet, EUI Working 
Paper RSCAS 2014/115
The creation of a single European railway area is the overall policy 
objective of the European Union for the railway industry. Rail 
infrastructure management is seen as a natural monopoly to be 
operated at a national scale. Competition is possible downstream in 
the provision of rail transport services. A European-wide market of 
rail transport services would benefit from larger economies of scale, 
and competition would ensure such efficiencies are passed down to 
European citizens and businesses. However, the reform process has been 
set back by Member States that disagree with the full vertical separation 
of infrastructure management and transport service provision, as well 
as by Member States that want to delay the full liberalization of the 
industry. As a consequence, inconsistent national models are emerging 
and non-sustainable asymmetries between Member States are creating 
tensions. The Fourth Railway Package is the opportunity to conclude the 
European railway reform process, both for commercial services and for 
public contract services. Imaginative solutions are necessary to reach a 
workable consensus.
Knieps, Günter, 2012, Competition and the railroads: A European 
perspective, Discussion Paper, Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und 
Regionalpolitik, No. 142 
The reform of European railroads is a time-consuming process strongly 
characterized by its path-dependency. In this paper, Prof Knieps firstly 
provides with a short outline of the historical roots of the controversial 
debates on the role of the state and the markets, focusing also on the 
organization of competition in European railroad industries. Secondly, 
he presents the opening of the market for train services in the context 
of the liberalisation of European transport markets since 1985. Thirdly, 
he analyses the evolution of track access regulation in Europe during the 
last decades, differentiating between the period of negotiated third party 
access since 1991, the introduction of ex ante regulation by the first railroad 
infrastructure package in 2001, and the danger of overregulation posed by 
the Draft Directive of July 2012 establishing a single European railway 
area. Fourthly, the role of competition on the markets for rail services and 
the reform process of interoperability requirements are considered. The 
paper concludes with an evaluation of competition on the markets for rail 
services and public subsidies for rail infrastructures as well as subsidies 
for train services.
Florence School of Regulation,
Transport Area 
European University Institute
Convento di San Domenico, 
Via delle Fontanelle 19
San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
50014 · Italy
Contact FSR-Transport:
 fsr.transport@eui.eu
Content © Authors, 2014
© European University Institute, 2014
FSR-Transport 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) is a project within the European University Institute (EUI) focusing 
on regulatory topics. It works closely with the European Commission, and is a growing point of reference for 
regulatory theory and practice. It covers four areas: Communications and Media, Energy (Electricity and Gas), 
Transport and Water.
The FSR-Transport Area’s main activities are the Florence Transport Forums, which address policy and regulatory 
topics in different transport sectors (Rail, Air, Urban, Maritime, Intermodal transport and Postal and delivery 
services). They bring relevant stakeholders together to analyse and reflect upon the latest developments and 
important regulatory issues in the European transport sector. These Forums inspire the comments gathered in 
this European Transport Regulation Observer.
Complete information on our activities can be found online at:  fsr.eui.eu
QM-AU-14-005-EN-N
ISSN: 2467-0405
